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Abstract
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where
the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing
the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal
networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies
on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent
to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the
periphery is connected to a single node in the core.
∗Bloch’s research was supported by Agence Nationale de la Recherche though grant ANR-
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grants 2014/13/B/ST6/01807 and 2018/29/B/ST6/00174.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
03
13
2v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  9
 Ja
n 2
02
0
1 Introduction
This paper analyses network design problem of (say) the leader of a covert organi-
sation who has to construct a network connecting members of her organisation as
well as choose her own (hiding) position in the network. She faces an adversary
who can “attack” one node in the network so as to catch the leader and disrupt the
network. Related issues have a very long standing. According to Greek mythology,
Daedalus invented the Labyrinth in order to hide the monstrous Minotaur.1 Tun-
nels and underground chambers in Medieval castles and fortresses were built to hide
treasures or prisoners. Underground fortifications were constructed in the XXth
century to hide weapons and combatants. In modern days, criminals and terrorists
build covert networks in order to hide leaders, money or secret instructions.
When an object or a person is being hidden, it must also be accessible for
those who need it. The Minotaur cannot be sealed off in the Labyrinth, because
every nine years, he receives a tribute of seven young boys and seven young girls
from Athens. The medieval treasures and prisoners, the weapons and combatants
of military forts also need to be recovered and freely moved. Leaders of criminal
and terrorist organizations, secret plans and money must also be able to freely
and efficiently move in the network. Hence, the design of networks to hide always
involves a trade-off between security (the inviolability of the hiding place) and
connectivity (the accessibility of hidden objects and persons). We show below that
our network design problem also exhibits this trade-off, and go on to characterise
an optimal network design as a function of this trade-off between security and
efficiency.
We construct a zero-sum game with two players, a Hider and a Seeker. In
the first stage of the game, the Hider designs a network which is observed both
by the Hider and Seeker. In the second stage of the game, the Hider and Seeker
simultaneously choose a node in the network (where the Hider hides and the Seeker
seeks or attacks). The Seeker is able to observe any node that is a neighbour of
the node attacked by her. If the Hider hides in any of the nodes observed by the
Seeker, the Seeker “captures” her and obtains a penalty from the Hider. If the
Seeker does not find the Hider, she is still able to disrupt part of the network, by
removing the node that she attacks. The Hider then receives a payoff which is an
increasing function of the size of the component in which she hides. The payoff in
the zero-sum two-person game thus consists of two elements: (i) a benefit (to the
Seeker) of capturing the hidden object or person and (ii) a benefit (to the Hider)
of using a network connecting a given number of nodes.
We characterise optimal network architectures chosen by the Hider. The op-
timal network can only take one of two forms: either it contains a cycle (where
all nodes are connected in a circle) or is a special core-periphery network where
half of the nodes form an interconnected core, and the other half are leaves, each
connected to a single node in the core.2 In addition, a subset of the nodes will
remain isolated. The number of isolated nodes, and the choice between the circle
1See Book 8 in Ovid’s Metamorphosis.
2If the number of nodes in the core-periphery network is odd, the architecture is slightly
different, with three core nodes node connected to a periphery node.
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and the core-periphery network for connected nodes depends on the parameters
of the game, and in particular the shape of the function mapping the size of the
network into the benefit of the Hider. Moreover, in the cases where non-singleton
nodes form a core-periphery network, the characterisation of optimal network we
obtain is complete.
To understand this characterisation of an optimal network, notice that any
network which cannot be “disrupted” (in the sense that the network is not broken
into different components if the Seeker fails to find the hidden object) must be
two-connected, and hence contain a cycle. Now, adding links to the cycle can only
increase the sizes of the neighborhoods and hence the probability that the hidden
object is discovered.3 Therefore, if the objective of the Hider is primarily to avoid
disruption of the network, forming a cycle will be an optimal choice for the hider.
Notice however that in a cycle, every agent has two neighbors, so the probability of
discovery of the hidden object must be at least equal to 3
n
. In order to reduce this
probability of discovery, while keeping the network connected, one has to allow
for the possibility that some nodes only have degree one. In the core-periphery
network where half of the nodes are leaves connected to one node in the core, the
probability of discovery is reduced to the minimal value for a connected graph. In
equilibrium, the Hider chooses to hide in any of the peripheral nodes, whereas the
Seeker seeks in any of the core nodes. This uniform hide and seek strategy results
in a probability of discovery equal to 2
n
, lower than in the cycle, but induces a
larger disruption, as the size of the remaining component after the Seeker fails to
find the object is equal to n − 2 rather than n − 1. In the main characterization
Theorem, we show that no other network performs better than the cycle or the
core-periphery network. The cycle is preferred when the Hider puts more weight
on avoiding disruption and the core-periphery network is preferred when the Hider
puts more weight on avoiding discovery of the hidden object.
While no real network has the exact architecture of a cycle or core-periphery
network, our results echo some observations on the trade-off between security and
efficiency in physical networks of military fortifications and human networks of
criminals and terrorists.
Following the trench warfare of World War 1, the French army built the “Mag-
inot line”, a system of underground fortifications to protect the border between
Germany and France between 1929 and 1935.4 The design of the underground
tunnels struck a balance between separating blocks (where combatants could hide)
and allowing for easy communication of men and materials. Figure 1 provides an
example of the underground tunnels in three of the largest fortifications of the
Maginot line: the Hackenberg, Mont des Welches and Fermont “gros ouvrages”.
It shows that blocks are not directly connected to each other (echoing the fact
that peripheral nodes are only connected to one node in the core and not to each
other nor to a central node), while central areas (where men sleep and weapons
3Notice however that adding links may not change the probability of capture, if the hider only
hides in a subset of the nodes in the cycle.
4Ironically, the Maginot line proved useless during the German invasion of France in May 1940,
as the German army simply by-passed the line of fortifications and entered France from Belgium
and Luxembourg.
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and ammunition are stored) form a well-connected core in the middle of the “gros
ouvrage”.
Gros	  ouvrage	  of	  Hackenberg
Gros	  ouvrage	  of	  Fermont
Gros	  ouvrage	  of	  Mont	  des	  Welches
Figure 1: Three “Gros Ouvrages” of the Maginot Line
Morselli et al. (2007) illustrate the trade-off between security and efficiency
using data on terrorist networks (Krebs (2002)’s map of the 9/11WTC terrorist
cells) and criminal networks (a drug-trafficking network in Canada). They argue
that terrorist networks are more likely to have longer average distances and fewer
connections with no node assuming a central position, whereas criminal networks
are more clustered and exhibit a core of nodes with high centrality. In addition
they note that support nodes (which are not direct perpetrators of criminal or
terrorist activities) help connect distant nodes in terrorist networks but not in
criminal networks, where each support agent is attached to a single agent in the
core. These two network architectures (long lines and core-periphery with clusters)
can be related to the cycle and the core-periphery network we identify in our
analysis. Figure 2 illustrates these network architectures, by reproducing the map
of the 9/11 WTC terrorist network (Krebs (2002)) as well as the maps of two
drug-trafficking mafia groups collected by Calderoni (2012).
4
The	  9/11WTC	  terrorist network
Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells  / Krebs46
I was amazed at how sparse the network was and how
distant many of the hijackers on the same team were
from each other.  Many pairs of team members where
beyond the horizon of observability (Friedkin, 1983)
from each other – many on the same flight were more
than 2 steps away from each other.  Keeping cell mem-
bers distant from each other, and from other cells,
minimizes damage to the network if a cell member is
captured or otherwise compromised.  Usama bin
Laden even described this strategy on his infamous
video tape which was found in a hastily deserted house
in Afghanistan. In the transcript (Department of
Defense, 2001) bin Laden mentions: 
Those who were trained to fly didn’t know the others. 
One group of people did not know the other group. 
The metrics for the network in Figure 2 are shown
below and in Table 1. We see a very long mean path
length, 4.75,  for a network of less than 20 nodes.
From this metric and bin Laden’s comments above we
see that covert networks trade efficiency for secrecy. 
no shortcuts with shortcuts
Group Size
Potential Ties
Actual Ties
Density
  19
342
  54
       16 %
19
342
66
19%
Geodesics
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
  = without shortcuts = with shortcuts
Yet, work has to be done, plans have to be executed.
How does a covert network accomplish its goals?
Through the judicious use of transitory short-cuts
(Watts, 1999) in the network.   Meetings are held that
connect distant parts of the network to coordinate
tasks and report progress.  After the coordination is
The	  N’Drangheta network	  of	  cocaine
trafficking (operationChalonero)
The	  N’Drangheta network	  of	  cocaine
trafficking (operation Stupor Mundi)
Figure 2: Three examples of terrorist and criminal networks
2 Related literature
The related literature spans a variety of disciplines, with the earlier literature
focusing more on the aspect of hiding and seeking. Perhaps, the first paper was by
von Neumann(1953) who discusses a zero-sum game where H chooses a cell of an
exogenously given matrix, while S simultaneously chooses a column or row in the
matrix. S “captures” H if the cell chosen by H lies in the row or column chosen by
S. A related paper is Fischer (1993), who too analyses a similar zero-sum game,
where H and S simultaneously choose vertices of an exogenously given graph. H is
caught if S chooses the same node as him or a node connected to the node chosen
by him. Interestingly, the value of this “hide and seek game” on a fixed arbitrary
network can been computed following Fisher (1991), using fractional graph theory.
5.
Computer scientists have also contributed to this literature. with Waniek et al.
(2017) and Waniek et al. (2018) studying a related, but different problem, of hiding
in a network. They consider the leader of a terrorist or criminal organization, and
ask the following question: How can a set of edges be added to the network in order
to reduce the leader’s measure of centrality in order to avoid detection? Waniek
et al. (2017) show that, both for degree and closeness centrality, the problem is
NP-complete. However, they also propose a procedure to build a new network
from scratch around the leader (the “captain network”) which achieves low levels
5 (See also Theorem 1.4.1 in Scheinerman and Ullman (1997))
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of degree and closeness centrality but high values of diffusion centrality, where
diffusion centrality is measured using the independent cascade and linear threshold
diffusion models. Waniek et al. (2018) extend the analysis to betweenness centrality
and to the detection of communities (rather than individuals) in the network.
Notice, however, that these models are not fully strategic since S does not best
respond to H’s strategy.
Our paper is also related to a recent strand of the economics literature analyzing
network design and attack and defense on networks. Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008)
study network design by an adversary (a criminal organization) taking the detection
strategy of the defender as fixed. They highlight differences between two forms of
detection, one which depends on the cooperation between criminals and the other
which does not. In both situations, they characterize the optimal network archi-
tecture of the criminal network, which either consists of isolated two-player cells
(with independent detection) or an asymmetric structure with one agent serving as
an information hub (with cooperation-based detection). Goyal and Vigier (2014)
propose an alternative model of network design where the defender designs the
network and chooses the distribution of defense across nodes before the attacker
chooses to attack. Nodes are captured according to a Tullock contest function
given the resources spent by the attacker and the defender. If a node is captured
by the attacker, contagion occurs and the attacker starts attacking neighboring
nodes while the defender loses his defense resources. The main message of Goyal
and Vigier (2014) is that the defendant optimally forms a star and concentrates
all the defenses at the hub. Dziubin´ski and Goyal (2013) analyze a related model,
where the defender designs the network and chooses defense resources before the
attacker attacks. As opposed to Goyal and Vigier (2014), contagion does not oc-
cur and the network structure only matters through the payoffs of the two-person
zero-sum game between the defender and the attacker. The objective function of
the defender is assumed to be increasing and convex in the size of components of
the network, reflecting the fact that the defender wants to avoid disruption in the
network. The analysis shows that the designer will either form a star and protect
the hub, or not protect any node and choose to form a (k + 1)-connected network
when the attacker has k units, so that the attacker will not be able to disrupt
the network. In the same model, Dziubin´ski and Goyal (2017) study equilibrium
strategies of the defender and attacker for any arbitrary network structure while
Cerdeiro et al. (2017) consider decentralized defense decisions by the different nodes
in the network.
The main difference between our paper and the recent literature on design,
attack and defense stems from the fact that one particular node - the location cho-
sen by the Hider- has a special significance in our model. Moreover, the capture
of this node has a significant impact on payoffs. In other words, our model also
incorporates the hiding-and-seeking aspect that is missing from the recent litera-
ture. Another difference comes from the timing of the game. We suppose that
the hider and seeker simultaneously choose the nodes in which to hide and that
they inspect, resulting in equilibria in mixed strategies as in Colonel Blotto games,
whereas Goyal and Vigier (2014) and Dziubin´ski and Goyal (2013) assume that
the defender and attacker move sequentially, allowing for pure strategy equilibria.
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Note also that nodes cannot be defended in our analysis.
3 The Model
There are two players, a Hider (H) and a Seeker (S). The hider H constructs a
network among n nodes and chooses a location in the network. For example, the
Hider may be the leader of a covert terrorist or criminal organisation, which has
n − 1 other members. The seeker is then interpreted as a law enforcing agency
whose objective is to capture the leader of the organization or to disrupt the com-
munication channels within the organisation. The interaction between H and S is
modeled as a two-stage process, which is described below.
In the first stage, H chooses a network of interactions amongst the members of
the organisation. Formally, H chooses a graph G = 〈V,E〉 where V is a set of n
vertices, and E is a set of undirected edges E ⊆ (V
2
)
. A typical edge e ∈ E will be
denoted ij, where i, j ∈ V .
Both players observe the chosen network at the beginning of the second stage.
After observing the network G, players H and S simultaneously choose one node
each. The node chosen by the hider is his (hiding) position in the network. The
node chosen by the seeker is the node she inspects (or attacks). Let k be the node
chosen by S, and NG(k) = {j ∈ V |kj ∈ E}. That is, NG(k) is the set of all
neighbours of k in G. All nodes in {k} ∪NG(k) can be observed by the seeker. If
the chosen position of H is in {k} ∪NG(k), then H is captured by S. In addition,
node k is removed from the network, irrespective of whether H is captured or not.
The seeker uses his choice to capture the hider and to damage the network.
Payoffs depend on whether or not the hider has been captured. If caught, the
hider gets payoff −β, where β ≥ 0.
If the hider is not captured, the covert network remains operational, but is
damaged by the attack of the seeker. Then the hider’s payoff depends on the size
of the component he is hiding in in the residual network. Formally, his payoff is
given by a function f : R≥0 → R≥0 of the size of his component in the residual
network. We assume f to be strictly increasing with f(0) = 0. An example of
function f in line with these assumptions is the identity function, f(x) = x for all
x ∈ R≥0. The game is assumed to be a zero-sum game, so that the payoff to the
seeker is equal to minus the payoff of the hider.
Formally, given a set of nodes U ⊆ V , let G(U) be the set of all undirected
graphs over U and let G = ⋃U⊆V G(U) be the set of all undirected graphs that
can be formed over V or any of its subsets. A strategy for the hider is a pair
(G, h) ∈ G(V )× V , where G is the graph and h is the hiding place chosen by H in
G. As the seeker chooses his inspected node after observing the network, a strategy
for the seeker is a function s : G(V )→ V .
Before defining the payoffs we introduce some auxiliary definitions on networks.
Given a set of nodes U ⊆ V and a graph G = 〈U,E〉 over U , a maximal set of
nodes C ⊆ U such that any two nodes i, j ∈ C are connected in G is a component
of G.6 The set of all components of G is denoted by C(G). In addition, given
6 Two nodes i, j ∈ U are connected in G = 〈U,E〉 if there exists a sequence of nodes i1, . . . , il
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i ∈ U , let Ci(G) be the component in G containing i. Given a set of nodes U ⊆ V ,
a graph G = 〈U,E〉 over U , and a set of nodes U ′ ⊆ U , let G[U ′] = 〈U ′, E[U ′]〉
with E[U ′] = {ij ∈ E : {i, j} ⊆ U ′} be the subgraph of G induced by U ′. Given a
node k ∈ V let G − k = G[U \ {k}] be the residual network obtained from G by
removing k and all its links from G.
Given the strategy profile ((G, h), s), the payoff to the hider is
ΠH(G, h, s) =
{ −β if h ∈ {s(G)} ∪NG(s(G))
f(|Ci(G− s(G))|) otherwise. (1)
The payoff to the seeker is ΠS((G, h), s) = −ΠH((G, h), s).
The cycle network and the core-periphery networks will be important in our
analysis. The cycle network is the unique network where every node has exactly
two neighbors.
A core-periphery network over a set V = P ∪C of n nodes is defined as follows.
There are q ≥ dn/2e core nodes in set C = {c1, . . . , cq} and m ≤ bn/2c periphery
nodes in set P = {p1, . . . , pm}. Nodes of the core form a connected graph, while
each periphery node, pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is connected to core node ci. Nodes of the
core which are not connected to a periphery node are called orphaned . Figure 3
illustrates a core-periphery network with orphaned nodes.
Figure 3: A core-periphery network over 39 nodes, with 15 periphery nodes and 9
orphaned core nodes.
A particular class of core-periphery networks, which we call maximal, plays
a crucial role in our characterization. If n is even, a core-periphery network is
maximal if and only if it has n/2 periphery nodes and nodes of the core form a
2-connected graph.7 If n is odd, a core-periphery network is maximal if and only
if it has (n − 3)/2 periphery nodes (and hence 3 orphaned nodes), nodes of the
such that i0 = i, in = j, and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , l}, ik−1ik ∈ E.
7 A graph is 2-connected if and only if it does not get disconnected after removing a single
node.
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core form a 2-connected graph, and one orphaned node has exactly the two other
orphaned nodes as its neighbours. Examples of maximal core-periphery networks
are presented in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Maximal core-periphery networks over 16 nodes (left) and 17 nodes
(right).
4 The Characterization Result
Our objective in this section is to provide optimal networks for the hider as well as
to characterise the hiding and the seeking strategies on these networks. We show in
our main result (Theorem 1) that these networks consist of a number of singleton
nodes and a connected component which contains either a cycle or has a particular
core periphery topology.
Whether a cycle or a core-periphery topology is better for the hider depends on
the value of the following expression.
T (n, s) = (n− s− 3)f(n− s− 1)− (n− s− 2)f(n− s− 2). (2)
We will show that the cycle topology is better if T (n, s) > β, while a core-periphery
topology is better when T (n, s) < β.
The following lemma asserts that in an optimal network there cannot be a
component containing just two or three nodes. The lemma will be used in the
proof of the main theorem.
Lemma 1. Suppose G is an optimal network for H whose set of non-singleton
components is X . Then, each component C ∈ X contains at least 4 nodes.
Proof. Suppose the lemma is not true and some C ∈ X has exactly three nodes,
C = {n1, n2, n3}. Following standard arguments, C must have a non-empty in-
tersection with the support of H’s optimal hiding strategy as well as S’s optimal
seeking strategy, given G. (If not, the hider or the seeker would have profitable
deviations). Moreover, conditional on hiding in C, H is caught with probability ρ,
where ρ is the total probability with which S seeks in C. This is true because S
can always search one node in C that has two neighbours, and hence observe all
nodes in the component.
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Let G′ be another network which coincides with G everywhere except that C
is broken up into singleton components {n1}, {n2}, {n3}. Moreover, suppose H’s
hiding strategy coincides with that in G everywhere on V \C, while H distributes
the earlier probability weight on C uniformly on the three nodes n1, n2, n3. It is
straightforward to check that H’s expected payoff in G′ is strictly higher than his
expected payoff in inspecting a node in the component C, which must be equal to
his expected payoff of using a mixed strategy in G, contradicting optimality of G.
A similar argument rules out an optimal network containing a component with
only two nodes.
Remark 1. An implication of this lemma is that the optimal network will either be
completely disconnected with n singletons or will contain at most n− 4 singletons.
This implication will be used throughout the proof of the theorem.
At this stage, we describe the main result of the paper somewhat informally. A
formal statement appears towards the end of the section.
We will construct an equilibrium that will have the following features.
• The optimal network G will have a certain number of singleton nodes s (that
will be determined) where s ≤ n− 4 or s = n.
• If T (n, s) ≥ β and s 6= n, then G has a cycle component over n− s nodes.
• If T (n, s) < β, n− s ≥ 4, then G will have a maximal core periphery compo-
nent over n− s nodes.
• The hider mixes between hiding in the singleton nodes and in the connected
component with probabilities that will be determined. When hiding in the
singleton nodes, he mixes uniformly across all these nodes. When hiding in
the connected component, he mixes uniformly across all the nodes when it
is a cycle, mixes uniformly across the periphery nodes when it is a maximal
core-periphery network over even number of nodes, and mixes between hiding
in periphery nodes, mixing uniformly across them, and the middle orphaned
node, otherwise.
• The seeker mixes between seeking in the singleton nodes and in the connected
component. When seeking in the singleton nodes, he mixes uniformly across
all these nodes. When seeking in the connected component, he mixes uni-
formly across all the nodes when it is a cycle, mixes uniformly across the
core nodes when it is a maximal core-periphery network over even number
of nodes, and mixes between seeking in the neighbours of periphery nodes,
mixing uniformly across them, and the middle orphaned node, otherwise.
To get some intuition behind the result, notice that the hider faces a tradeoff
between the cost of being caught and the value he gets in the residual network.
Adding links in the network increases connectivity and hence secures a larger value
after the the seeker’s action provided he is not caught. However, a larger number
of links also leads to higher exposure and a greater probability of being caught, as
it increases the size of the neighborhoods of the nodes in which the hider can hide.
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Fixing the number of singleton nodes, s, the choice between a cycle and a core-
periphery network is influenced by the change in f , as measured by the quantity
T (n, s). The probability of being caught in a cycle of size n − s is 3/(n − s), as
each node has exactly two neighbours, while only one node is lost from the cycle
component if not caught. The probability of being caught in a maximal core-
periphery network (if n− s is even), on the other hand, is 2/(n− s) since the hider
hides mixing uniformly across the periphery nodes; in the event of not being caught,
two nodes are lost from the core periphery component since the seeker seeks mixing
uniformly across the core nodes. If the change in f between n− s−2 and n− s−1
is sufficiently large, so that T (n, s) > β then the marginal loss from an additional
node being removed from a component is high, as compared to the penalty for
being caught, and, therefore, a cycle is preferred over the core-periphery network.
If the change in f is not sufficiently large, on the other hand, the marginal loss
from an additional node being removed from a component is not sufficiently high
and the hider prefers to opt for the safer, core-periphery, network.
The proof of the theorem is long and we provide a brief description of the
general technique before giving the details.
We start by constructing a feasible strategy of the seeker that, for each network
over the set of nodes V , provides a (mixed) seeking strategy on that network. This
strategy determines the payoffs the seeker can secure for each possible network over
V . Since the game is zero-sum, minus these payoffs provide an upper bound on
the payoff the hider can get for each network. Next, for each s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 4, n},
we construct a network that is optimal for the hider across all possible networks
with exactly s singleton nodes. In the case of T (n, s) ≥ β, as well as in the case of
s being even, these networks yield payoffs to the hider that meet the upper bound
determined in the first part of the proof. In the case of T (n, s) < β and odd s, the
upper bound from the first part of the proof is not exact. Therefore in this step
we establish both the optimal networks for the hider and the exact upper bound
on the hider’s payoff.
We will use a series of lemmas to prove the theorem. We first introduce a parti-
tion of the nodes into different sets that will play a crucial role in the construction
of a strategy for the seeker.
Given a (possibly disconnected) network G over the set of nodes V , node i ∈ V
is a singleton node if |NG(i)| = 0. The set of singleton nodes of G is denoted by
S(G). Node i ∈ V is a leaf if |NG(i)| = 1. The set of leaves of G is denoted
by L(G). Given node i ∈ V , let li(G) = |NG(i) ∩ L(G)| denote the number of
leaf-neighbours of i.
Let
M(G) = {i ∈ V : li(G) = 1}
be the set of nodes which are connected to exactly one leaf in G and let
SL(G) = {i ∈ L(G) : NG(i) ∩M(G) 6= ∅}
be the set of leaves connected to an element of M(G). Such leaves are called
singleton leaves. Let R(G) = V \ (S(G)∪ SL(G)∪M(G)) be the set of nodes in G
which are neither a singleton, nor a singleton leaf, nor a neighbour of a singleton
leaf.
11
We now construct a strategy for the seeker which guarantees a given payoff for
any network G. Take any network G over V and let s = |S(G)| and m = |M(G)|.
Moreover, let GR = G[R(G)] be the subnetwork of G generated by the set of nodes
R(G). In particular, when R(G) = ∅, GR is the empty network with empty sets of
nodes and links. Let D(GR) be the set of nodes in R(G) that belong to two-element
subsets of R(G).
Consider a mixed strategy of player S, σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), with the following
probabilities:
σ = λSσ
S + (1− λS)
(
λRσ
R + (1− λR)σM
)
(3)
where λR, λS ∈ [0, 1], and
σSi =
{
1
s
, if i ∈ S(G),
0, otherwise,
σMi =
{
1
m
, if i ∈M(G),
0, otherwise,
σRi =

li(GR)+1
n−s−2m , if i ∈ R(G) \ (L(GR),
1
n−s−2m , if i ∈ D(GR),
0, otherwise,
We first show that these probabilities are well-defined.
Lemma 2. σ is a feasible strategy for the seeker S.
Proof. Clearly, σS is a valid probability distribution as long as S(G) 6= ∅, that
is s > 0. Similarly, σM is a valid probability distribution as long as M(G) 6= ∅,
that is m ≥ 1. It is also easy to see that σR is a valid probability distribution
as long as R(G) 6= ∅. To see this, notice that R(G) contains exactly n − s − 2m
nodes and σR can be obtained from a uniform distribution on R(G) by moving
the probability mass assigned to leaves in GR \D(GR) to their neighbours. Lastly,
notice that if S(G) 6= ∅, then either all the non-singleton nodes in G have degree 1,
in which case M(G) 6= ∅, or there exists a node in G of degree 2 or more, in which
case either M(G) 6= ∅ or R(G) 6= ∅. Hence if S(G) 6= ∅, then either σM or σR
is a valid probability distribution. By these observations, σ is a valid probability
distribution as long as λS = 1, if s = n, λS = 0, if s = 0, λR = 0, if R(G) = ∅, and
λR = 1, if m = 0. So, the lemma is true.
The idea behind the construction of strategy σ is as follows. With probability
λS, player S seeks in the set of singleton nodes, S(G), and with probability (1−λS)
he seeks outside this set. Conditional on seeking outside S(G), with probability
λR player S seeks in the set of nodes R(G) and with probability (1− λR) he seeks
in the set SL(G) ∪M(G). When seeking in S(G), S mixes uniformly across all
the singleton nodes. When seeking in SL(G) ∪M(G), S mixes uniformly across
all the nodes neighbouring a singleton leaf, that is all the nodes in M(G). Lastly,
when seeking in the set of nodes R(G), S mixes using strategy σR. In the next
two lemmas, we compute lower bounds on the probability of capture of the hider
in different regions of the network.
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Lemma 3. The probability of capture of player H is at least (1− λS)λR3/(n− s−
2m), if H hides in R(G) \ (S(GR) ∪ SL(GR) ∪D(GR)).
Proof. Take any node i ∈ R(G) \ (S(GR)∪SL(GR)∪D(GR)). Suppose, first, that
i is not a leaf in GR, i.e. i ∈ R(G) \ L(GR). Then i has at least two neighbours
in R(G) and the probability that seeker seeks at i or at one of i’s neighbours is at
least (1−λS)λR3/(n−s−2m). Suppose, next, that i ∈ L(GR)\(SL(GR)∪D(GR)).
Then i has a neighbour j ∈ R(G) that has at least one more leaf neighbour in GR.
Since σj = (1− λS)λR3/(n− s− 2m), the lemma is true.
Lemma 4. The probability of capture of player H is at least (1− λS)λR3/(n− s−
2m), if H hides in S(GR) ∪ SL(GR) ∪D(GR).
Proof. In this case, i must have a neighbour, j, in M(G). For otherwise i would be
a singleton node in H or a singleton leaf in H and so i would belong to S(G)∪M(G)
and not to R(G). Now,the probability of S putting a seeking resource in j is
σj = (1− λS)(1− λR)
(
1
m
)
≥ (1− λS) min
(
1,
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β)
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β) + (n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
)(
1
m
)
= (1− λS)
(
3(f(n− s− 1) + β)
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β) + (n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
)
> (1− λS)
(
3(f(n− s− 2) + β)
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β) + (n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
)
= (1− λS)λR
(
3
n− s− 2m
)
.
Thus i is caught with probability at least (1− λS)λR3/(n− s− 2m).
We now use these characterisations to compute lower bounds on the expected
payoff of the seeker when the hider hides in different parts of the network.
Lemma 5. Conditional on H hiding in a node of R(G) and S using σ, the expected
payoff of S is at least
LR(n,m, s) = (1− λS)
(
λR
((
3
n− s− 2m
)
β−
(
1− 3
n− s− 2m
)
f(n−s−1)
)
− (1− λR) f(n− s− 2)
)
− λSf(n− s) (4)
Proof. Suppose that H hides in R(G). From lemmas 3 and 4, H is captured with
probability at least (1−λS)λR3/(n−s−2m) when S chooses σ. If not captured, only
one node is removed when S searches in R(G). With probability (1−λS)((1−λR), S
searches in M(G) and removes two nodes. Finally, with probability λS, S searches
in S(G), and does not catch H. Then, her payoff is at least −f(n−s) - this happens
if G is connected over n− s nodes.
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Similarly, we compute a lower bound on the expected payoff of the seeker when
the hider hides in M(G) or SL(G):
Lemma 6. Conditional on H hiding in a node of M(G) ∪ SL(G), player S by
choosing σ obtains a payoff of at least
LM(n,m, s) = (1− λS)
(
(1− λR)
((
1
m
)
β−(
1− 1
m
)
f(n− s− 2)
)
− λRf(n− s− 1)
)
− λSf(n− s),
Proof. The probability of capture of H is at least (1−λS)(1−λR)1/m. If H is not
captured, S guarantees that the component of the hider has size at most n− s− 2
with probability (1 − λS)(1 − λR) when the attack is in M(G). Furthermore, at
least one node is removed with probability (1− λS)λR when the attack is in R(G).
Finally, the component containing H has size at most n− s when the attack is in
S(G), and this happens with probability λS.
We now set the value of λR in order to equalize the probability of capture of
the hider in different regions of the network, outside singleton nodes. To this end,
we assume that there exist non-singleton nodes in G, S(G) 6= V ,. Let
ρ =
(n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β) + (n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
= 1− 3m(f(n− s− 1) + β)
3m(f(n− s− 1) + β) + (n− s− 2m)(f(n− s− 2) + β)
and
λR =
{
0, if R(G) = ∅,
ρ, otherwise.
(5)
Clearly ρ ∈ [0, 1] and λR ∈ [0, 1].
It is straightforward to verify that the chosen value of λR ensures that L
R(n,m, s) =
LM(n,m, s), for any s ∈ {0, . . . , n − 4}. Hence the lower bound on the payoff of
player S in G when H hides outside singleton nodes is
L(n,m, s) = LR(n,m, s) = LM(n,m, s) = (1− λS)A(n,m, s)− λSf(n− s) (6)
where
A(n,m, s) =

β
m
− (m−1
m
)
f(n− s− 2), if R(G) = ∅,(
D(n,s)D(n−1,s)
3D(n,s)−2D(n−1,s)
)(
3(β−T (n,s))
m(3D(n,s)−2D(n−1,s))+(n−s)D(n−1,s) − 1
)
+ β,
otherwise
with
D(n, s) = f(n− s− 1) + β
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and
T (n, s) = (n− s− 3)D(n, s)− (n− s− 2)D(n− 1, s) + β
In particular, the derivation above is valid for the extreme cases of m = 0 and
m = (n− s)/2). Notice that A(n,m, s) is strictly increasing in m if T (n, s) > β, is
strictly decreasing in m if T (n, s) < β, and is constant if T (n, s) = β.
To complete the definition of strategy σ we compute the value of the probability
of seeking in singleton nodes, λS. Conditional on H hiding in a node of S(G),
using any of the strategies σ defined above, player S obtains payoff of at least
LS(n,m, s) = λSB(s)− (1− λS) f(1), where
B(s) =
(
1
s
)
β −
(
1− 1
s
)
f(1),
regardless of the strategy of the hider, as the probability of capture is λS/s and, in
the case of not capturing the hider, S gets payoff −f(1). Let
λS =

1, if s = n,
A(n,m,s)+f(1)
A(n,m,s)+B(s)+f(1)+f(n−s) , if s 6= n and A(n,m, s) > −f(1),
0, otherwise.
To see that λS ∈ [0, 1], notice that B(s) > −f(1) ≥ −f(n− s), for any β ≥ 0 and
0 ≤ s ≤ n− 4.
It is straightforward to verify the following for any s ∈ {0, . . . , n− 4}:
(i) if A(n,m, s) > −f(1), then Ls(n,m, s) = L(n,m, s).
(ii) if A(n,m, s) ≤ −f(1) then Ls(n,m, s) ≥ L(n,m, s).
So, finally, if s ≤ n− 4, the lower bound on the payoff of player S in G is given
by
Q(n,m, s) = (1− λS)A(n,m, s)− λSf(n− s),
Of course, if s = n, σ mixes uniformly across the singletons with λS = 1.
To summarize, the lower bound on the payoff of S in G, secured by the strategy
σ, is given by
Q(n,m, s) =

B(n), s = n
A(n,m,s)B(s)−f(1)f(n−s)
A(n,m,s)+B(s)+f(1)+f(n−s) , if s ≤ n− 4 and A(n,m, s) > −f(1),
A(n,m, s), otherwise,
(7)
Recall that A(n,m, s) is increasing in m when T (n, s) > β, decreasing in m
when T (n, s) < β, and constant in m when T (n, s) = β. This, fact, together with
Claim 1 in the appendix implies that when s ≤ n − 4, Q(n,m, s) is decreasing in
m when T (n, s) < β, increasing in m when T (n, s) > β, and is constant in m when
T (n, s) = β. So for all s ∈ {0, . . . , n−4}, Q(n,m, s) is minimised at m = (n−s)/2,
when T (n, s) < β, and is minimised at m = 0, when T (n, s) > β.
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We now turn to the construction of networks that are optimal for the hider.
Fix the number of singleton nodes, s ≤ n − 4. Define a new function Q¯(n, s) as
follows
Q¯(n, s) =

Q(n, 0, s), if 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 4 and T (n, s) ≥ β,
Q(n, (n− s)/2, s), if 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 4, T (n, s) < β and n− s is even,
Q(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s), if 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 4, T (n, s) < β and n− s is odd.
Consider first the case where n− s is even.
Lemma 7. Suppose H builds a network with s singleton nodes such that n − s
is even. Then, an optimal strategy for H provides H with payoff −Q¯(n, s). If
T (n, s) < β, G is optimal if the subnetwork over n − s nodes is a maximal core-
periphery network. If T (n, s) > β, G is optimal if the subnetwork over n− s nodes
is a cycle.
Proof. Fix s such that n− s is even. Let
A¯(n, s) =
{
A(n, (n− s)/2, s), if T (n, s) < β,
A(n, 0, s), if T (n, s) ≥ β.
and let
κ =
{
B(s)+f(1)
A¯(n,s)+B(s)+f(n−s)+f(1) if A¯(n, s) > −f(1),
1, otherwise.
(8)
Let H choose a network G such that :
(i) G has exactly s singletons.
(ii) G is a maximal core periphery on n− s nodes if T (n, s) < β.
(iii) G is a cycle on n− s nodes if T (n, s) ≥ β.
Moreover, suppose that the hider hides in the component of size n − s with
probability κ, mixing uniformly on the periphery nodes in the case of the component
being a core-periphery network, and mixing uniformly over all its nodes in the
case of the component being a cycle. Also, she hides in the singleton nodes with
probability 1− κ, mixing uniformly on them. By similar arguments to those used
for λS above, κ ∈ [0, 1] and so the strategy is valid. If the seeker seeks in the
singleton nodes, this yields payoff of at least κf(n− s)− (1− κ)B(s) to the hider.
Similarly, if the seeker seeks in the core-periphery component, this yields payoff of
at least −κA¯(n, s) + (1 − κ)f(1) to the hider. With the value of κ, above, both
values are equal in the case of A¯(n, s) > −f(1), and the latter is greater, otherwise.
Hence, the strategy guarantees a payoff −κA¯(n, s) + (1 − κ)f(1) to the hider.
Note that
−κA¯(n, s) + (1− κ)f(1) = −Q¯(n, s)
Recall that we have shown that Q¯(n, s) is the minimal payoff the seeker can
get on any network with exactly s singleton nodes. Since the game is zero-sum,
−Q¯(n, s) is the maximal payoff the hider can get on any network with exactly s
singleton nodes and hence the network constructed above as well as the hiding
strategy must be optimal for the hider.
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Next, consider the case of n− s being odd.
Lemma 8. Suppose that n− s is odd. Then, an optimal strategy for H gives him
a payoff of −Q(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s). If T (n, s) < β, G is optimal if the subnetwork
over n−s nodes is a maximal core-periphery network. If T (n, s) > β, G is optimal
if it the subnetwork over n− s nodes is a cycle..
Proof. Let
A¯(n, s) =
{
A(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s), if T (n, s) < β,
A(n, 0, s), if T (n, s) ≥ β.
and let κ be defined as in (8). If T (n, s) ≥ β than choosing a cycle over n−s nodes
and using the same hiding strategy as in the case of n − s being even, the hider
secures the highest possible payoff on a network with exactly s singleton nodes.
Suppose that T (n, s) < β. Since (n − s)/2 is not an integer, the hider cannot
attain the upper bound on his payoff determined by the lower bound on the payoff
to the seeker, Q¯(n, s). Recall that if T (n, s) < β then for any 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 4,
Q(n,m, s) is decreasing in m. We show below for any 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 4, the hider can
attain payoff −Q(n, (n − s − 3)/2, s), and that this is the maximal payoff he can
secure when n− s is odd.
Suppose that the hider chooses a maximal core-periphery network (with three
orphaned nodes) over n− s nodes (c.f. Figure 5).
Figure 5: A core-periphery network over 23 nodes with 3 orphaned nodes.
Consider a strategy of the hider
η = κ(µηM + (1− µ)ηR) + (1− κ)ηS,
where
ηMi =
{
1
m
, if i ∈ SL(G),
0, otherwise,
(i.e. ηM mixes uniformly on the periphery nodes of G),
ηRi =
{
1, if i is the middle orphaned node in G,
0, otherwise,
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ηSi =
{
1
s
, if i ∈ S(G),
0, otherwise.
(i.e. ηS mixes uniformly on the singleton nodes of G), and
µ =
(n− s− 3)f(n− s− 2) + (n− s− 3)β
(n− s− 3)f(n− s− 1) + 2f(n− s− 2) + (n− s− 1)β .
It is immediate to see that µ ∈ [0, 1] and so the hiding strategy is valid. If the seeker
seeks in the orphaned nodes of the core-periphery component, this yields payoff of
at least κ(µf(n− s− 1)− (1−µ)β) + (1− κ)f(1) to the hider and, since the game
is zero-sum, of at most minus this value to the seeker. Similarly, if the seeker seeks
in periphery nodes or their neighbours in the core-periphery component, this yields
payoff of at least κ(µ(−2β/(n − s − 3) + (1 − 2/(n − s − 3))f(n − s − 2)) + (1 −
µ)f(n− s− 2)) + (1− κ)f(1) to the hider and of at most minus this value to the
seeker. With the value of µ, above, both these guarantees are equal.
It is straightforward to verify that
κ(µf(n− s− 1)− (1− µ)β) + (1− κ)f(1) = −κA(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s) + (1− κ)f(1)
= −Q(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s).
Since Q(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s) is a lower bound on the payoff that the seeker can
secure in a network with exactly s singleton nodes and at most (n − s − 3)/2
singleton leaves, the negative of this value is the highest payoff that the hider can
secure in a network with exactly s singleton nodes and at most (n − s − 3)/2
singleton leaves. The only networks that could yield a higher payoff to the seeker
are networks with exactly s singleton nodes and (n−s−1)/2 singleton leaves. But
we show in Lemma 9 in the appendix that these networks have a lower value for
the hider.
Since the game is zero-sum, the hider maximises his payoff when the seeker’s
payoff is minimised. Therefore, an optimal network has s ∈ S∗(n) singleton nodes,
where
S∗(n) = arg min
s∈{0,...,n}
Q¯(n, s).
Lemmas 7 and 8 have therefore proved the characterization result that we sum-
marize in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. For any number of nodes, n ≥ 1, and any β ≥ 0 there exists an
equilibrium of the game, ((G, h), s) such that
• G has exactly s ∈ S∗(n) singleton nodes and either s ≤ n− 4 or s = n.
• If T (n, s) ≥ β and n−s ≥ 4 then G has a cycle component over the remaining
n− s nodes.
• If T (n, s) < β, n − s ≥ 4 then G has a maximal core-periphery component
over n− s nodes.
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• The hider mixes between hiding in the singleton nodes and in the connected
component. When hiding in the singleton nodes, he mixes uniformly across
all these nodes. When hiding in the connected component, he mixes uniformly
across all the nodes (when it is a cycle), mixes uniformly across the periphery
nodes (when it is a maximal core-periphery network and n− s is even), and
mixes between hiding in periphery nodes, mixing uniformly across them, and
the middle orphaned node (otherwise).
• The seeker mixes between seeking in the singleton nodes and in the connected
component. When seeking in the singleton nodes, he mixes uniformly across
all these nodes. When seeking in the connected component, he mixes uni-
formly across all the nodes (when it is a cycle), mixes uniformly across the
core nodes (when it is a maximal core-periphery network and n− s is even),
and mixes between seeking in the neighbours of periphery nodes, mixing uni-
formly across them, and the middle orphaned node (otherwise).
Equilibrium payoff to the hider is −Q¯(n, s).
We have shown in the proof of Theorem 1, that the equilibrium payoff to the
seeker in an optimal network with at least one singleton node is a convex combi-
nation of B(s) which is greater than −f(1)) and −f(1) and so it is at least −f(1).
Hence the payoff that the hider can secure in such a network is at most f(1). Thus
if the payoff the seeker can secure in a connected component of size n, A¯(n, 0) is
smaller than −f(1), then the payoff the hider can secure in such a component is
−A¯(n, 0) > f(1). If that inequality holds, it is optimal for the hider to choose a
connected network without singleton nodes.
If, on the other hand, the cost of being caught, β, is sufficiently high then
A¯(n, 0) > −f(1) and the payoff the hider can secure in a connected network,
−A¯(n, 0), is less than the payoff he gets if he is not caught in a singleton node.
This leads the hider to construct a network with a smaller component and s ≥ 1
singleton nodes. If the cost of being caught is sufficiently high, it is optimal for the
hider to choose a disconnected network with s = n singleton nodes.
The characterization of equilibrium networks provided in Theorem 1 is not
complete. This Theorem displays network architectures which achieve the high-
est possible payoff for the hider, but does not show that these network topologies
are unique. As we prove below, if T (n, s) < β the connected component must
be a maximal core-periphery network. So in this case we obtain complete char-
acterization of equilibrium networks.If T (n, s) > β there exist network topologies
other than the cycle which are optimal. We establish necessary properties that the
optimal network topologies must possess.
Theorem 2. For any number of nodes, n ≥ 1, and any β ≥ 0, if ((G, h), s) is an
equilibrium of the game then
• G has exactly s ∈ S∗(n) singleton nodes.
• If T (n, s) < β, n − s ≥ 4, then G has a maximal core-periphery component
over n− s nodes.
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• If T (n, s) > β, then G has a 2-connected component over n− s non-singleton
nodes with at least d(n− s)/3e nodes of degree 2 and the hider never hides in
nodes of degree greater than 2 in equilibrium.
Proof. The fact that G must have exactly s ∈ S∗(n) singleton leaves is already
established in proof of Theorem 1. For the properties of the remaining part of
equilibrium network, we consider the cases of T (n, s) < β and T (n, s) > β sepa-
rately.
Suppose that T (n, s) < β. Suppose first that n − s is even. Since Q(n,m, s)
is decreasing in m and the maximum feasible value for m, when n − s is even, is
(n−s)/2 so the subnetwork over n−s non-singleton nodes in any optimal network
must have (n − s)/2 singleton leaves. If the network is optimal, the neighbours
of the singleton leaves must form a 2-connected network. Otherwise, the seeker
would obtain a payoff that is strictly higher than Q¯(n, s) by mixing uniformly on
the neighbours of non-singleton leaves when seeking outside singleton nodes. This is
because in the case of not capturing the hider, he will leave the subnetwork over n−s
nodes disconnected with probability greater than 0. Hence the optimal subnetwork
over n−s non-singleton nodes must be a maximal core-periphery network. Second,
suppose that n−s is odd. As we showed in proof of Lemma 8, the optimal number
of singleton leaves in the subnetwork over n−s non-singleton nodes is (n−s−3)/2.
Moreover, as we argued above, nodes which are not singleton leaves must form a
2-connected network. Thus this subnetwork must be a core-periphery network
with 2-connected core and three orphaned nodes. What remains to be shown is
that one of the orphaned nodes must have exactly the other two orphaned nodes
as its neighbours in this subnetwork. Since the subnetwork formed by the nodes
of the core must be 2-connected, any node of the core must have at least two
neighbours. Suppose, to the contrary, that each of the orphaned nodes has at least
one neighbour that is not an orphaned node. Then, mixing uniformly on non-
orphaned core nodes, the seeker captures the hider with higher probability than
in a maximal core-periphery network (regardless of the strategy of the hider) and
causes the same damage in the case of not capturing the hider. This results in
strictly lower payoff to the hider than −Q¯(n, s) and so the network is not optimal.
Therefore the neighbours of one of the orphaned nodes must be exactly the two
other orphaned nodes.
Suppose next that T (n, s) > β. In this case, Q(n,m, s) is increasing in m and
so the optimal network has no singleton leaves in the subnetwork over the n − s
non-singleton nodes. Let U be the set of n− s non-singleton nodes in the network
and let F be the subnetwork over this set of nodes. As argued above, the seeker has
a seeking strategy that guarantees him a probability of capture at least 3/(n− s)
in F . If F is not 2-connected, the seeker will leave the subnetwork disconnected
in the event of not capturing H. This gives strictly lower payoff to H than in the
cycle. Hence F must be 2-connected. Hence all the nodes in F have degree at least
2. Suppose that F has t < d(n− s)/3e nodes of degree 2. Note that since F is 2-
connected, only one node is removed if H is not captured. So, the expected payoff of
H (and hence S) only depends on the probability of capture. Consider any strategy
η of H and let T be its support on U . Let σ′T be a mixed strategy of the seeker
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that mixes uniformly on NF [T ].
8 Let σT = λσ
′
T + (1 − λ)σS be a strategy of the
seeker that mixes uniformly on the singleton nodes with probability 1−λ and uses
σ′T with probability λ, where λ is such that the lower bound on the expected payoff
to the seeker when the hider hides in T is equal to the lower bound on the expected
payoff to the seeker when the hider hides in singleton nodes. Notice that the lower
bound on the expected payoff to the seeker from using σ′T when the hider hides in T
is strictly higher than 3/(n− s). For if T contains a node of degree at least 3 then
the seeker captures the hider with probability strictly greater than 3/|NF [T ]| ≥
3/(n−s), and if T does not contain a node of degree 3 then |NF [T ]| ≤ 3|T | < n−s
and the seeker captures the hider with probability 3/|NF [T ]| > 3/(n − s). Hence
there exists pT > Q¯(n, s) such that the expected payoff to the seeker from using σT
against any strategy of the hider, η, with support T on U is at least pT . Taking
ε = minT⊆U(Q¯(n, s)−pT ) shows that F cannot be optimal forv H. Notice also that
if the support of H’s strategy in a network with 2-connected component F contains
nodes of degree greater then 3 then strategy σ guarantees the seeker payoff strictly
greater than Q¯(n, s). Therefore, in equilibrium, the hider never hides in nodes of
degree greater than 2 in the 2-connected component of an optimal network.
We next provide examples of topologies of the connected component other than
the cycle in equilibrium networks for the case of T (n, s) > β. Suppose that n−s =
3t where t ≥ 2 is an integer. Let U be the set of nodes of the component. Suppose
that the nodes in U are connected, forming a cycle, and let T ⊆ U , |T | = t, be
a subset of the nodes such that any two nodes in T are separated by two nodes
from U \ T . Any network obtained from from the cycle by adding links between
the nodes in U \ T is optimal (an example is presented in Figure 6). Both players
mixing uniformly on U is an equilibrium on any such network.
Figure 6: An optimal component for n− s = 12.
Theorems 1 and 2 provide a characterization of optimal networks for the hider
in terms of the quantity T (n, s). As this expression is not transparent, we provide
sufficient conditions on the utility function f(·) which guarantee that the connected
component of an optimal network is a maximal core-periphery network.
8 Given graph G = 〈V,E〉 and a set of nodes U ⊆ V , set NG[U ] = U ∪ {v ∈ V : uv ∈
E for some u ∈ U} is the closed neighbourhood of U in G.
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Theorem 3. Suppose that either
(i) f is concave, or
(ii) f is convex and for all x ≥ 2
f(x+ 1) <
x
x− 1f(x)
Then, for all n ≥ 1, and any β ≥ 0, G is an equilibrium network if and only if G
has s ∈ S∗(n) singleton nodes and a maximal core-periphery component over n− s
nodes. In addition, if f is linear then S∗(n) = {0, 1, n}.
Proof. Notice that
T (n, s) = (n− s− 3)∆f(n− s− 2)− f(n− s− 2)
and
T (n, s+ 1) = (n− s− 3)∆f(n− s− 3)− f(n− s− 2)
Hence,
T (n, s+ 1)− T (n, s) = −(n− s− 3)(∆f(n− s− 2)−∆f(n− s− 3))
= −(n− s− 3)∆2f(n− s− 3).
where ∆f(x) = f(x+ 1)− f(x) is the first-order (forward) difference of f at x and
∆2f(x) = ∆f(x + 1) − ∆f(x) is the second-order (forward) difference of f at x.
Hence, if f is concave, then ∆2f(n− s− 3) ≤ 0, and so
T (n, s+ 1)− T (n, s) ≥ 0 for all s ≤ n− 4
In addition T (n, n−4) = f(3)−2f(2) which is negative if f is concave and strictly
increasing. Thus for all n ≥ 4 and s ≤ n− 4, T (n, s) < 0 ≤ β.
From Theorems 1 and 2, G is an equilibrium network if and only if its connected
component is a maximal core-periphery network over n− s nodes.
If f is convex then ∆2f(n − s − 3) ≥ 0 and T (n, s + 1) − T (n, s) ≤ 0, for all
s ≤ n− 4. Thus T (n, s) is decreasing in s on [0, n− 4], for all n ≥ 4.
Suppose that f(x + 1) < x/(x − 1)f(x) for all x ≥ 2.9 Then T (n, 0) = (n −
3)f(n− 1)− (n− 2)f(n− 2) < 0 and so
T (n, s) ≤ T (n, 0) < β, for all s ∈ [0, n− 4].
Again, by Theorems 1 and 2, G is an equilibrium network if and only if its
connected component is a maximal core-periphery network over n− s nodes.
Next, note that if n ≤ 5, then Lemma 1 shows that s∗ ≤ 1. Suppose that f is
linear and that n ≥ 6. We show in the Appendix (Lemma 10) that if n ≥ 6, then
Q(n, (n− s)/2, s) is minimised either at s = 0 or at s = 1 or at s = n. This shows
that s∗ ∈ {0, 1, n} and completes the proof of the theorem.
Remark 2. The theorem establishes a full characterization of equilibrium networks
when f is concave or convex but growing slowly.
9 An example of a family of strictly increasing convex functions that satisfy this property are
the functions f(x) = xγ/(x+ 1)γ−1 with γ > 1.
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5 Conclusions
We proposed and studied a strategic model network design and hiding in the net-
work facing a hostile authority that attempts to disrupt the network and capture
the hider. We characterized optimal networks for the hider as well as optimal hid-
ing and seeking strategies in these networks. Our results suggests that the hider
chooses networks that allow him to be anonymous and peripheral in the network.
We also developed a technique for solving such models in the setup of zero-sum
games.
There are at least two avenues for future research. Firstly, different forms of
benefits from the network could be considered. For example, the utility of the hider
could dependent not only on the size of his component but also on his distance to
the nodes in the component. Given our results, we conjecture that this would
make the core periphery components with better connected core more attractive.
But answering this problem precisely requires formal analysis. Secondly, the seeker
could be endowed with more than one seeking unit and the units could be used
either simultaneously or sequentially. Our initial investigation suggests that solving
such an extension might be an ambitious task.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Lemma 9. If n − s is odd and T (n, s) < β, the hider obtains a higher expected
payoff in a core-periphery network with (n − s − 3)/2 singleton leaves than in a
core-periphery network with (n− s− 1)/2 singleton leaves.
Proof. In a core-periphery network with (n − s − 1)/2 singleton leaves, the set
R(G) consist of exactly one node and this node is connected to at least two nodes
in M(G). It cannot be connected to one node in M(G), because in this case its
neighbour would have two leaf-neighbours and could not be a member of M(G).
Let σ˜ = λσS + (1 − λ)σM, where σM and σS are the mixed strategies of the
seeker, defined earlier in the proof,
λ =
{
X(n,s)+f(1)
B(s)+X(n,s)+f(1)+f(n−s) , if X(n, s) > −f(1),
0, otherwise,
and
X(n, s) =
2β
n− s− 1 −
(
1− 2
n− s− 1
)
f(n− s− 2).
Using this strategy, with probability λ, S mixes uniformly on the nodes in M(G)
and with probability (1− λ), S mixes uniformly on the singleton nodes of G. The
payoff to S conditional onH hiding in a singleton node is at least λB(s)−(1−λ)f(1)
and the payoff to S conditional on H hiding outside singleton nodes is at least
(1−λ)X(n, s)−λf(n− s). It is easy to verify that the value of λ is such that both
these payoffs are equal (in the case of X(n, s) > −f(1)) or the latter is higher, for
any value of λ. Therefore the payoff to S from using σ˜ against any strategy of H
is at least
Y (n, s) =
{
B(s)X(n,s)−f(1)f(n−s)
B(s)+X(n,s)+f(1)+f(n−s) , if X(n, s) > −f(1),
X(n, s), otherwise,
and so the upper bound on the payoff to the hider on any network with s singleton
nodes and (n−s−1)/2 singleton leaves is at most −Y (n, s). To see that −Q(n, (n−
s− 3)/s, s) > −Y (n, s) notice that
X(n, s)− A(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s) =
2(f(n− s− 1)− f(n− s− 2))(f(n− s− 2) + β)(n− s− 3)
(n− s− 1)(f(n− s− 1)(n− s− 3) + 2f(n− s− 2) + β(n− s− 1)) > 0
and so X(n, s) > A(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s).
Next consider the following Claim:
Claim 1. The function
ϕ(Z) =
{
B(s)Z−f(1)f(n−s)
Z+B(s)+f(n−s)+f(1) , if Z > −f(1),
Z, otherwise,
is strictly increasing in Z.
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Proof. Notice that ϕ(−f(1)) = −f(1) when Z = −f(1). Moreover, ϕ is increasing
in Z if Z < −f(1). Let Z > −f(1). Taking the derivative of ϕ with respect to Z
we get
ϕ′(Z) =
(B(s) + f(1))(B(s) + f(n− s))
(Z +B(s) + f(n− s) + f(1))2
and it is immediate to see that ϕ′(Z) > 0 and ϕ increases in Z when B(s) > −f(1)
and B(s) ≥ −f(n − s). Notice that B(s) = (β + f(1))/s − f(1) > −f(1) for
any β ≥ 0 and s > 0. Also f(n − s) ≥ f(1) for all s ∈ [0, n − 1]. Thus, by the
observation on function ϕ, above, ϕ(Z) increases when Z increases.
Claim 1, together with X(n, s) > A(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s), implies that Y (n, s) >
Q(n, (n− s− 3)/2, s), completing the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 10. Let λ > 0 and let f(x) = λx, for all x ∈ R≥0. For any natural n ≥ 6,
t ∈ {0, 1} and any s ∈ {t+1, . . . , n}, Q(n, (n−s)/2, s) > min(Q(n, 0, n), Q(n, (n−
t)/2, t))
Proof. Let f(x) = λx, with λ > 0, and let β˜ = β/λ. Let
A˜(n, s) = A(n, (n− s)/2, s) = λ
(
2
(
β˜ − 2
n− s
)
+ 4− (n− s)
)
, for 0 ≤ s ≤ n− 2,
B(s) = λ
(
β˜ + 1
s
− 1
)
,
and
Q˜(n, s) = Q(n, (n− s)/2, s) =

A˜(n, s), if A˜(n, s) ≤ −λ or s = 0,
AB(n, s), if 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 2 and A˜(n, s) > −λ
B(n), otherwise,
with
AB(n, s) = (1− ρ)A˜(n, s)− ρλ(n− s) (9)
where ρ solves
(1− ρ)A˜(n, s) + ρλ(s− n) = ρB(s)− (1− ρ)λ. (10)
Solving (10) we get
ρ =
s(2(β˜ − 2)− (n− s)(n− s− 5))
s(2(β˜ − 2)− (n− s)(n− s− 5)) + (n− s)(s(n− s− 1) + β˜ + 1)
.
Notice that 2(β˜ − 2) − (n − s)(n − s − 5) > 0 if and only if A˜(n, s) > −λ, and
(n−s)(s(n−s−1)+ β˜+1) > 0 for s ≤ n−1. Thus if A˜(n, s) > −λ then ρ ∈ (0, 1).
In addition B(s) > −λ, for all s > 0, so if ρ ∈ (0, 1) then AB(n, s) > −λ. Moreover,
A˜(n, s) is increasing in s on [0, n − 2] and it is equal to β at s = n − 2. By the
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observations above, if A˜(n, 1) ≤ −λ then Q¯(n, 0) = A˜(n, 0) < A˜(n, 1) = Q˜(n, 1) ≤
−λ < Q¯(n, s), for all s ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and the claim of the lemma holds.
For the remaining part of the proof suppose that A˜(n, 1) > −λ. This implies
2(β˜ − 2) > (n − 1)(n − 6) and, consequently, β˜ > 2 if n ≥ 6. We will show that
Q˜(n, s) is either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing on [0, n − 1].
Let s˜ = inf{s ∈ [0, n − 2) : A˜(n, s) ≥ −λ}. Since A˜(n, s) is increasing in s and
equal to β ≥ 0 at s = n− 2 so the infimum exists and s˜ is well defined. On [0, s˜],
Q˜(n, s) = A˜(n, s) and, as we argued above, Q˜(n, s) is increasing. Consider the
interval [s˜, n− 1]. Notice that since B(s) > −λ ≥ −λ(n− s), for all 0 < s ≤ n− 1,
and A˜(n, s˜) = −λ so AB(n, s˜) = −λ. In addition, AB(n, n) = B(n). We will show
that AB(n, s) is either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing on [0, n].
Inserting ρ into (9) we get
AB(n, s) =
(n2(β˜ + 1)− 2n(s(β/λ− 1) + 2(β˜ + 1)) + s2(β˜ − 3) + 6sβ˜ − 2(β˜ + 1)(β˜ − 2))
s(4s− β˜ + 5)− n(4s+ β˜ + 1)
.
Taking the derivative of AB(n, s) with respect to s we get
∂AB(n, s)
∂s
=
(β˜ + 1)W (s)
(s(4s− β˜ + 5)− n(4s+ β˜ + 1))2
,
where
W (s) = Xs2 − 2Y s+
(
n+
β˜ − 2
2
)
Y −
(
β˜ − 2
2
)
(n− 4)(β˜ + 1),
with X = 4n− β˜ − 15 and Y = 4n2 + n(β˜ − 19)− 8(β˜ − 2).
The sign of ∂AB/∂s is the same as the sign of W (s). Notice that W (n) =
−2(β˜ − 2)(n + β˜ − 5) < 0, as n ≥ 6 and β˜ > 2. When X > 0, then W (s) is
an
⋃
-shaped parabola and, since W (n) ≤ 0, either W is negative or W is first
positive and the negative on [0, n]. Thus in this case AB is either increasing or first
increasing and then decreasing on [0, n]. Similar observation holds when X = 0.
Suppose that X < 0. In this case W (s) is an
⋂
-shaped parabola and it has a
maximum at s∗ = Y/X. Suppose that s∗ ∈ (0, n − 2). Since X < 0 so Y < 0.
Moreover, for n ≥ 6, X < 0 implies β > 5 and, consequently,
W (s∗) = −Y s∗ +
(
n+
β˜ − 2
2
)
Y −
(
β˜ − 2
2
)
(n− 4)(β˜ + 1)
=
(
n− s∗ + β˜ − 2
2
)
Y −
(
β˜ − 2
2
)
(n− 4)(β˜ + 1) < 0.
Thus W is either negative or first positive then negative on [0, n], for any natural
n ≥ 5. Hence ABQ is either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing on
[0, n], for any natural n ≥ 6.
By the analysis above, when A˜(n, 1) > −λ then AB(n, s) is either decreasing or
first increasing and then decreasing in s on [0, n] and AB(n, n) = B(n). Hence, by
the definition of Q˜(n, s), the claim of the lemma follows immediately.
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